We analyze the daily positions of 31 foreign Central Banks in U.S. interest rate futures markets between 2003 and 2011 for targeted hedging or informed profit-making decisions. Central Bank positions before the financial crisis of 2007-2009 are consistent with hedging some underlying balance sheet exposure. During and after the crisis, the pattern suggests an attempt to enhance returns. In particular, Central Banks held and profited from directional positions in 5-and 10-year T-Note futures in a manner indicative of a non-hedging strategy. We also examine whether Central Bank position changes are synchronized in the sense that they tend to occur simultaneously. We identify differences before and after the onset of the financial crisis: Euro-linked Central Banks become more synchronized, whereas non-European Central Banks show no significant change during the crisis. We also document that Central Bank positions generally account for a small fraction of the overall size of the futures markets, so it is unlikely that these institutions' goal is to influence U.S. interest rates.
INTRODUCTION
Most Central Banks disclose little information about their activities in derivatives markets.
When there is public disclosure, it usually occurs in annual reports, is limited in scope, and often claims hedging as a motive for derivatives positions. Only a few Central Banks admit that they seek to enhance returns with such positions. We investigate these claims by testing whether Central Banks' actual positions in U.S. interest-rate futures markets are consistent with targeted hedging or, alternatively, speculative activities. We pay special attention to trading during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 because low interest rates and macroeconomic uncertainty in that period may have caused greater risk taking, perhaps due to reserve managers' incentive schemes 1 or the need to fund government treasuries. 2 We also ask whether the 2007-2009 financial crises brought about greater synchronization of Central Banks' futures trading. Although several papers investigate how Central Banks changed their reserve holdings after the onset of the crisis, our interest is in whether the financial crisis influenced their incentive to use derivatives, leading to more synchronized behavior in futures markets.
3 Importantly, while a single Central Bank's futures trades may have a benign effect on prices, if a set of those institutions react in similar ways to exogenous shocks, then the combined effects may be of consequence to other market participants and to market regulators.
1 For example, Scalia and Sahel (2012, p. 1) document "the existence of risk-shifting behavior by (European Central Bank or ECB-linked) reserve managers related to their year-to-date ranking: interim losers increase relative risk in the second half of the year, in the same way as mutual fund managers." These authors show that those managers' risk-taking incentives are magnified by the annual frequency of reports to the ECB Governing Council and, consequently, the nature of the managers' reputational reward structure. More generally, Remolona and Schrijvers (2004, p. 97) argue that, in an environment "of historically low yields on highly-rated government securities, Central Bank reserves managers seek instruments with higher yields in an effort to enhance returns." 2 Usually, Central Banks return net surpluses to their own governments' treasury, which may encourage profitmaking to reduce political pressure on bank managers. Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito (2012, p. 389) argue that the Bank of Japan (and possibly the People's Bank of China) engage(s) in carry trades for a profit-making motive. 3 See, for example, Dominguez (2012), Steiner (2013) and references cited therein. mention derivatives at all, even though it is understood by market participants that they use such instruments in reserve management. The remaining Banks do not offer any rationale for why they hold derivative positions. In all cases, the annual reports are accounting statements and
show only stocks at a certain time or aggregate flows over a year.
To gain additional insight into Central Bank motives, we use the CFTC-sourced dataset on daily positions in the four interest rate futures markets most used by the Central Banks in our sample: Eurodollars as well as 2-, 5-and 10-year Treasury notes. The daily magnitude of Central Banks' U.S. futures positions, while large individually, are generally small compared to the overall market, which suggests no intention to affect U.S. interest rates. Accordingly, we investigate alternative reasons for Central Banks' use of these markets.
We argue that pure hedgers might adjust their futures positions in response to volatility changes but would not adjust them consistently in response to changes in the price level. Using for Euro-linked Central Banks, whose interest rate futures positions were more profitable than other Central Banks' during the crisis period. We address possible reasons why our test could falsely reject hedging (e.g., if Banks experienced repeated unexpected balance sheet changes), but we argue that these reasons are not sufficient to explain our results.
We also find differences in the degree of co-movement or synchronization of Central Banks positions before and after the onset of the 2007-2009 financial crises. Only Euro-linked Central
Banks became more synchronized in their trading during the crisis period-consistent with the notion that they were affected by common shocks or, perhaps, coordinated their policy actions.
Overall, our results clarify the claims made in public documents about Central Banks' hedging motives. We establish that the hedging motive is present, but during the crisis profitlinked actions and common reactions to shocks also explain individual Banks' futures positions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the related literature.
Section 3 analyzes the information contained in public documents. Section 4 discusses our empirical methodology. Section 5 describes the trader-level information from the CFTC and the data used in our analyses. Sections 6 presents the results and Section 7 offers our conclusions.
RELATED LITERATURE
The present paper contributes to the literature on Central Bank policy as well as the research on hedging balance sheet risk. Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito (2012, p. 395) note that "researchers would like data on the types of securities (by currency, maturity, and risk-class) and types of deposits (by currency, type of financial institution taking deposits, and domestic or foreign) held in Forex (reserves) in order to analyze portfolio management of foreign currency reserves and intervention policy. However, in most countries, this kind of detailed information is not made public." Our analysis is partly a response to this observation. We focus on specific derivative markets in which we know the contractual details and can follow the actual holdings of Central Banks. Therefore, while we make inferences from only one part of the Banks' balance sheets, it is a part that explicitly reveals their risk exposure.
Our paper is closely connected to the 20 case studies published by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF, 2003a (IMF, , 2003b and to Blejer and Schumacher (2000) . These case studies shed light on official reserves management practices in IMF member countries but offer a limited analysis of derivatives data. Blejer and Schumacher (2000) focus on derivative use "as policy tools, i.e., operations designed to influence variables such as the exchange rate or the interest rate (p. 4)."
These authors' portfolio analysis is hypothetical, however, due to data limitations.
This paper is part of a growing body of research on foreign reserve management. Generally, it is argued that Central Banks do not try to influence asset prices in that context. Dominguez et al. (2012) , Scalia and Sahel (2012), and Dominguez, Fatum and Vacek (2013) At non-financial firms, there is considerable survey evidence that managers' market views affect their risk management decisions. 4 Econometric studies by Brown (2001) , Adam and Fernando (2006) , Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) , Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) and Beber and Fabbri (2012) find evidence of "selective hedging" (Stulz, 1996) 
PUBLIC INFORMATION ON CENTRAL BANK ACTIVITIES IN DERIVATIVES MARKETS
Public information on Central Bank derivative activities is collected by the IMF and also revealed in annual reports. Although limited and low-frequency, this information is helpful because it reveals to market participants the reality of Banks' involvement in derivatives markets and provides an occasional explanation for the objectives behind their positions.
IMF Survey of Central Bank Practices and Motives for Trading Derivatives
In an investigation of Central Bank practices in its member countries, the IMF found derivatives trading at 16 out of 20 institutions it surveyed (IMF 2003a, p. 32 Yet, the fact that we found 31 Central Banks in our CFTC sample (including some institutions absent from the public SDDS data) suggests a substantial reporting bias in the IMF database.
Overall, the public SDDS database highlights that selected Central Banks use derivatives in their operations. To examine which derivatives they use, how much, and possibly why, we turn next to Central Banks' annual reports.
Derivatives Information in Central Bank Annual Reports
We collect the annual reports of all non-U. The qualitative information we collect is whether the annual report discusses any derivatives activities and whether, in the affirmative, the institution provides one or more purposes for trading. Our approach is to search each annual report for derivatives-related terms such as (i) "derivative," "futures," "option," "forward," "swap" and "CFD"; (ii) "exchange-traded," "overthe-counter" and "OTC"; (iii) "hedging," "foreign (exchange) reserves" and "risk management,"
(iv) "risk-return," "speculation," "trade-offs" and "opportunistic". For each hit, we read and interpret the material before and after the search term's occurrence. 7 Most Central Banks provide these annual reports on their websites. When this information was not available electronically, we obtained hard copies from Central Banks' public relation offices.
The quantitative information collected includes the notional and fair values of Central Bank derivatives positions, separated by instrument and market when provided. To find these data, we peruse the financial statements for evidence of derivatives trading, income or notional positions. Table 1 provides counts of the information extracted from these annual reports. Table 2 examines the type of derivatives held and the stated purposes for trading, using 2009 as the reference year. Blinder et al. (2008) Only three Central Banks state explicitly that they do not trade any derivatives at all.
The most transparent Central Banks' provide annual snapshots of substantial positions in interest rate and foreign exchange-based instruments with some data on duration of the underlying asset class. In most other cases, the annual reports provide limited information about the magnitudes of such positions. Still, Panel B in Table 1 shows that, in any given year, at most three Central Banks that report using derivatives fail to specify the underlying asset. All the other Central Banks in our "SDDS+2" sample specify an underlying instrument: approximately 45% say that they trade interest rate derivatives and 60% report trading foreign exchange derivatives.
The annual reports of over 60% of all Central Banks either are silent or make only vague statements about a reason for using derivatives. As Table 1 shows, when a purpose is expressed, the vast majority claim to trade for risk management or hedging purposes. 9 Whether they trade interest rate derivatives or foreign exchange derivatives, only a handful of Banks acknowledge seeking to enhance returns or to synthetically replicate non-derivative financial instruments.
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To further understand how derivatives usage varies among Central Banks, Table 2 summarizes the textual information in the annual reports for fiscal year 2009. The sample is the same as in Table 1 ("SDDS+2"), but Table 2 Table 2 shows that advanced economies' Central Banks provide more information about derivatives use. Only two Banks from "Other OECD" countries make no reference to derivatives (Korea, Mexico) -although two others (Germany, Singapore) refer to derivatives in only the most general terms as part of a discussion of accounting valuation principles. 11 In contrast, Panel C in Table 2 shows that almost 30 percent of emerging markets' Central Banks (10 out of 34, including large countries such as China and Egypt) make no mention of using derivatives.
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Among the Central Banks in Table 2 In sum, the public information on Central Banks' derivatives positions has become more detailed over time. Still, what information is contained in annual reports is available at too low a frequency to test for the motives and profitability of Central Bank trading. To this end, we turn to the data on Central Bank positions in U.S. futures markets collected daily by the CFTC.
METHODOLOGY
We investigate three characteristics of Central Banks' futures positions in an attempt to isolate their purpose. First, we consider whether their positions yield consistent profits. Certainly, Central Banks have access to superior information about their own actions that may affect market prices (e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 2001) . Although the size of their futures positions seems large, it is small relative to the size of these markets, so Central Banks could disguise their 
Profits from positions and net trading
Central Bank participation in listed futures markets may be aimed at hedging specific interest rate risks on their balance sheet, particularly during the 2007-09 Recession when these Banks' loan portfolios expanded. To examine this question, we evaluate the profitability of Central Bank positions and net daily trading both during and outside of the crisis period.
To compute profits, we first characterize the structure of our position data in light of the fact Next, we show how we can represent daily profits as a function of observables and a single unobserved variable that we can approximate.
Aggregating over all trades (j=1, 2,…, J) and contracts (k=1, 2,…, K) on day t, we write the Bank's daily profit as * = ∑ ∑ , ( +1, − , ), =0 =1
( 1) where , denotes the price of contract k at the time of trade j. The initial day t price, 0, , equals the previous day's closing price and the final price, +1, , is the day t closing price. We rewrite equation (1) as Equation (2) represents daily profits as a function of observables and a single unobserved variable, * , . Because the j subscript is redundant in (2), we consolidate notation and write
where ∆ = − −1 denotes the change in closing price between day t-1 and t for the k th expiration and ∆ = − −1 denotes the change in closing open interest position between day t-1 and t. We compute daily trading profits using (3). As proxy for * , , we use the midpoint of the high and low prices observed during the day.
Hedging tests
If a Central Bank is hedging an underlying position, then changes in its futures positions should be driven by changes in the sensitivity of its cash flow to U.S. interest rates (Faulkender 2005 ). This sensitivity is in turn driven by volatility: the more volatile are interest rates, the more volatile should a Bank's cash flows be. 13 In contrast, a Bank that believes it can predict future price changes, or follows a momentum or contrarian strategy, will change positions in response to price changes. Fishe, Janzen, and Smith (2014) show that speculative traders who disagree on the fundamental price will exhibit position changes that are correlated with price changes.
The key observation here is that price changes should not affect position changes in a pure futures hedge. This observation suggests a first-order test for hedging behavior. We estimate the regression model
where ∆ is the change in futures position, ∆ is the change in volatility of interest rates on day t, ∆ is the change in the futures price and is an i.i.d. error term. In our estimation, we make each of these terms into relative changes, e.g., change in futures price relative to the previous (event time) futures price. The null hypothesis that a Bank is hedging is : = 0.
Note that if the size of a Bank's underlying position is correlated with prices, then we may reject the null hypothesis even though it is hedging. We explore this possibility in Section 6.2.
13 If a Central Bank were following a minimum-variance rule, it would also adjust the hedge when the hedge ratio changes --which may be due to changes in the variance of futures or spot prices or the correlation between cash and futures prices. Because spot and futures prices are highly correlated (typically greater than 0.94), position changes in our context are more likely due to changes in the variance of futures prices than changes in the correlation.
Co-movement/Synchronization
To investigate co-movement or synchronization, we study the timing of changes in Central Banks' positions. Specifically, we test if contemporaneous changes in Banks' positions occur more than suggested by randomness. Fisher and Konieczny (FK, 2000) and Cavallo (2011) suggest such synchronization tests for retail prices. We adapt the FK methodology to examine
Central Banks' actions in futures markets. The FK index of synchronization, adapted to position changes in a given futures contract, may be written as:
where represents the proportion of Central Banks that changed their holdings in a given futures at time t. The mean of is given by ̅ = ∑ =1 ⁄ with 2 representing the sample variance defined over T periods.
The intuition here is that if all Central Banks act simultaneously, they all change their positions ( = 1) or none of them change their positions ( = 0). In that case, is a binary variable and the sample variance, 2 , equals ̅(1 − ̅). As such, FK equals one in the case of full synchronization. A complete lack of synchronization is referred to as a "staggering" of position changes. Full staggering is characterized by = ̅ ∀ , which implies FK = 0. In other words, if
Central Banks change positions such that a constant proportion ( ̅) = of all Banks change their holdings every period, then there is no synchronization, just randomness.
Further insight into the structural basis of the FK measure is provided by Dias et al. (2005) , who model a set of participants as one of two types: either fully synchronized or fully nonsynchronized. These authors show that FK is a method-of-moments estimator of the proportion of synchronized participants. Thus, we can interpret FK to measure the fraction of Central Banks acting in a synchronized manner in U.S. futures markets.
To implement the FK calculation, we examine changes in Central Bank positions on a weekly basis. We use a weekly measure because a daily measure could miss some synchronized actions due to trading decisions' arising in different time zones. On a given day, we aggregate the same-side positions across expirations, which gives a total long ( ) and total short ( ) for bank i at the end of week t and allows us to compute the total net position = − .
We develop two directional measures of trading:
= 1 iff ∆ > 0; = 0 otherwise, and
where ∆ ≡ − −1 . These two statistics define binary variables that indicate whether the net position change in week t is directed towards long-side or short-side profitability.
Specifically, if a Central Bank increases a long futures position, then that is a profitable decision if the futures price subsequently increases. Similarly, if a Central Bank decreases a short futures position, that decision is also profitable in terms of opportunity cost provided the futures price subsequently increases. Both changes together would result in = 1 = 0 in the data for bank i. Because banks remain neutral in some weeks, it is not always the case that = 1 −
. We define these statistics in terms of position changes rather than levels because, if the trading of different Central Banks is synchronized, then we would expect their actions to be consistent with a specific direction in futures prices, regardless of the their initial holdings.
We calculate the proportion of Central Banks who changed their holdings ( ) for the two directional measures specified above. (2005) show that this hypothesis may be tested using a 2 goodness-of-fit statistic. The appropriate test statistic has the form:
where, under the null, ~ ( −1)
2
. Rejecting this null provides additional support for the view that at least some Central Banks' futures trades are synchronized.
CFTC POSITION DATA
We construct a database of end-of-day positions in interest-rate futures contracts. The raw data originate from the CFTC's Large Trader Reporting System, which represents more than 85
percent of the open interest in these interest rate futures markets. The volume that is not covered by this dataset is for consistently smaller traders; all large traders are captured by the reporting requirements. The CFTC provided data from July 2003 to December 2011.
14 Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980 Taylor ( , 1999 develop two macroeconomic models that embed sticky behavior by firms that results in staggered price setting. Kiley (2002) offers a comparison of these two models. For our purposes, we extend these concepts to sticky trade decisions, which then can result in staggered position changes through time.
Sample
We use information from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to identify alternative Central Bank names and the CFTC's list of "ultimate" position owners to find Central Banks in the CFTC data. This procedure identifies 31 Central Banks from around the world holding derivatives positions large enough to be reported at some point in our sample period. Third, the positions held range from just large enough to be reported to substantial. However, 16 We focus therefore on Eurodollars, as well as 2-year, 5-year and 10-year T-Notes futures. Similarly, the daily change in positions is meaningful across these contracts with changes in long positions tending to be larger than changes in short positions (except for 2-year Notes).
Summary statistics
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Expiration counts and the time remaining in a contract suggest that Central Banks typically hold the nearby contracts in the Treasury complex. For Eurodollars, the time remaining in a contract is fairly low-both mean and median. Expiration counts also suggest that Central Banks hold spread or butterfly Eurodollar futures positions.
Although Bank positions are monetarily significant, on average they are not meaningful given the size of these markets. Thus, the purpose behind such positions is likely not to influence U.S. interest rates. In effect, the small size of these holdings relative to the market as a whole suggests that participation in these markets is likely driven by an internal calculation based on how policy decisions may affect a Banks' overall balance sheet or by portfolio management considerations for foreign reserve assets.
ANALYSIS
This section presents the results of the tests developed in Section 4. We investigate the profitability of Central Banks' positions and trading (6.1), their purposes for using interest-rate futures (6.2) and the possible synchronization of their trading activities (6.3). Table 4 As to the hedging motive, the overall profit column supports the statements of Central Banks in their annual reports. Specifically, no Bank would persist in holding or taking positions for losses in these markets if there was no material offset somewhere on its balance sheet. However, some contracts-5-year and 10-year Notes-and the group of Euro-linked Banks may reveal a different motive. For these contracts and Banks, substantial profits are found during various periods. Thus, a speculative motive may also be at work for selected Central Banks.
Central Bank profits from holding futures contracts
Dynamic hedging tests
The results in Table 4 are indicative of Central Bank profits and motives but do not involve a statistical test for hedging. Next, we apply the hedging test described in Section 4.2. Table 5 shows hedging test results for the entire sample period by commodity. Observations are for each Central Bank over time, so we use a pooled cross-section time-series model with a fixed parameter structure. For each bank, we only include daily observations for which the net position change was nonzero and there is no weighing by the size of a Bank's position. The dependent variable is the ratio of the change in net long positions (long minus short) divided by the total of long and short positions. Price changes are measured using close-to-close prices between the included observations.
We compute the variance of futures prices using the prices of options on futures. We calculate option-implied volatilities using the formula that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) uses for its VIX calculation, which is in standard deviation units. For each trading day we use the nearest-to-maturity option with more than one month to expiration (e.g., for the October expiration in Treasury bonds, we use the December expiration options contract), and we omit any option contracts with zero volume on the relevant trading day. We conduct robustness checks of our hedging tests using an implied volatility series from the Commodity Research Bureau, which is based on Black's formula and the two nearest-to-the-money puts and calls.
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The lower (DW-lower) and upper (DW-upper) Durbin-Watson p-values are shown for an AR (1) model at the bottom of the table. The results in Table 5 support the view that Central Banks use futures markets for hedging purposes, because the coefficient on the price change tends to be statistically insignificant. The exception is the 10-year Note, which exhibits a significant positive coefficient on the price change variable.
In Table 6 , we re-estimate our model by partitioning the sample into before, during, and after the Great Recession period. These three sub-periods are the "Pre-Crisis," defined as July Panel A in Table 6 shows that this partitioning of the sample has meaningful effects on these hedging tests. For every commodity, the relative price change variable is statistically significant during the crisis period and insignificant during the pre-crisis period. The positive sign indicates that Central Banks appear to use a momentum strategy; that is, they increase their net long positions when prices are increasing.
As an alternative to the momentum interpretation of these results, the findings shown in Another possible story is that, as long-term interest rates dropped amid the financial crisis, the fear of possible capital losses in the event that rates rebounded might have led reserve managers to increase the hedge. Because T-Note futures prices and interest rates are inversely related, however, we would expect the signs of the regression coefficients to be the opposite of those in Table 6 Eurodollars in particular, the relative price change coefficient indicates that these effects increased by an order of magnitude. A hedging explanation may still be viable, but it is more difficult to believe that balance sheet changes were unexpected at this point. Given Central Banks' access to information during the crisis and afterwards, these post-crisis significant effects suggest that informed, strategic trading may be a better explanation for our findings.
Euro-linked Central Banks make up approximately one-third of our sample and constitute a reasonably homogeneous sub-group. We therefore re-estimated the hedging test for that subgroup of Banks. These results are shown in Panel B in Table 6 . The results generally confirm the full sample findings, except that now the pre-crisis coefficient on the relative price change variable is significant for Eurodollars, 2-year and 10-year Notes, suggesting a possible nonhedging motive in certain contracts prior to the crisis for these Banks. Combined with the previous observations for Panel A, these findings lean towards a speculative motive for futures positions, possibly because of information relevant to particular contracts.
To better understand the idiosyncratic features of these different Central Banks, we reestimate the hedging-test model on each Bank separately. Because we are using daily frequency data, a few Banks drop out of our sample as they do not have enough variation for reliable estimation. The final sample contains 28 Central Banks. We report the sign of the relative price change variable and its p-value in Table 7 . The R 2 range and the count of significant (5% level) coefficients for each commodity are shown at the bottom of this table.
The significance counts at the bottom of Table 7 indicate that our findings are too frequent to be generated by chance. Thus, we are statistically confident that many of these Central Banks are adjusting futures positions coincident with price changes, which is not standard if they have adopted an effective hedging strategy. Importantly, the inconsistency in the sign of the coefficient on the relative price change variable suggests either quite different hedging instruments (assets versus liabilities) or selective use of information. Because some Central
Banks show futures profits, the selective use of information motive cannot be readily dismissed.
Overall, these tests suggest that hedging is unlikely to be the sole purpose for Central Bank positions in U.S. futures markets.
Rolling Measure of Synchronization
We compute the FK synchronization measure for a one-year moving window starting in 2004. We roll this calculation forward using one week increments to the end of the sample. 
Staggered Position Changes
The patterns appearing in Figures 2 and 3 
CONCLUSIONS
We provide the first position-level evidence on derivative use by Central Banks in financial markets where there is no a priori reason to believe that their goal is to influence asset prices.
We exploit a unique, comprehensive, non-public dataset of individual traders' daily positions in U.S. interest-rate futures markets between 2003 and 2011 to test the rationale for such positions provided from limited public data -mostly the information contained in their annual reports.
On average, the actual trading behavior of the 31 Central Banks in our sample seems consistent with the hedging purposes mentioned by the vast majority of those institutions.
However, an analysis using sub-samples (around the Great Recession and by country group) 1  30  18  19  44  22  33  2006  3  1  30  17  20  45  27  33  2007  1  1  31  19  22  46  26  36  2008  3  1  28  18  20  51  37  38  2009  1  1  31  19  22  53  36  39  2010  2  1  30  18  22  51 No") , or provides no information ("None"). For the 55 Central Banks that report using derivatives, the second column shows whether the report provides information about the amounts involved (either notional or fair values). For both interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives, the next four columns show whether the report states that it uses forwards (FW), futures (FT), swaps (SW), or options (OP), and whether its purposes are for hedging (H), liquidity (L), or speculation (S). The (a) entries mean that derivatives are referenced in general terms but there is no affirmative statement of their use. 
Position and Net Trading Profits
This table reports the average daily position and net trading profits for the sample of all Central banks by period and futures instrument. Profits for the sub-sample of Euro-related Central banks are shown separately. This sub-sample includes some but not all of the Euro-related banks shown in Table 3 . Net trading profits during a given day use the midpoint of the high and low price as the reference trade price in Equation (2) We test for evidence of hedging using the sample of central banks from August 2003 to December 2011. Results are provided for position changes in four futures markets: Eurodollars and Two-, Five-, and Ten-year treasury note futures. These effects are measured using trade frequency data defined for each bank individually. That is, on a given day, positions are summed across all expirations for each central bank. Days are then ordered in sequence and an observation is retained in the sample if it shows a position change from the previous day. A model is estimated for each commodity. The dependent variable is the ratio of the change in net long positions (long minus short) divided by the total of long and short positions. Price changes are measured using close-toclose prices between the included observation days, the VIX index is computed using options on futures in each commodity market following the procedures used to compute the CME VIX. The effects are measured using trade frequency data defined for each bank individually. That is, on a given day, positions are summed across all expirations for each CB. Days are then ordered in sequence, and an observation is retained in the sample if it shows a position change from the previous day. A model is estimated for each commodity. The dependent variable is the ratio of the change in net long positions (long minus short) divided by the total of long and short positions. Price changes are measured using close-to-close prices between the included observation days. The VIX index is computed using options on futures in each commodity market following the procedures used to compute the CME VIX. The lower (DW-lower) and upper (DWupper) Durbin-Watson p-values are shown for an AR(1) model at the bottom of the table. Regressions marked with an asterisk ("*") are estimated after correcting for an AR (1) We refine the test for hedging by estimating results for each Central Bank separately. The specification and estimation approach are the same as Table 5 . We report the sign of the price change variable and its p-value. The dependent variable is the ratio of the change in the net long positions (long minus short) divided by the total of long and short positions and each regression includes the relative price change variable and the relative change in price volatility as measured by the VIX. The R-squared range and the count of significant (5% level) coefficients for each commodity out of all tested banks are shown at the bottom of the table. 
